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ABSTRACT: These days people keep wondering whether the world is more dangerous now than 
it was before. Do natural disasters really happen more frequently or is it just that the damage 
they cause that has become greater? The situation is not quite clear. As a result of the globalizing 
world and advanced communication infrastructure, the number of known / reported catastrophes is 
relatively high, but that does not necessarily mean there has been an actual increase in frequency. 
The red mud spill in Hungary was a special combination of industrial and natural disasters. This is 
one of the reasons why it is very hard to pinpoint who is responsible for the event. Natural disasters 
tend to raise questions about responsibility that are different from those concerning industrial 
catastrophes. Interestingly enough, however, nature often plays an important role in industrial 
disasters. The present article is concerned with how the issues of responsibility are handled in the 
case of industrial disasters.
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I. INTRODUCTION
 
Tom Massey, director of RWE Power, admitted 
in reply to a question that “Fifteen years ago, 
companies were saying that climate change was 
not relevant to business. You could not measure it, 
companies had no individual responsibility for it 
and there were no global regulations to control it. 
Many companies argued it was not happening at 
all. Scientific evidence and government action have 
fundamentally changed this scenario.” 
 Yet this is just the usual way in 
environmental protection. The carcinogenicity of 
asbestos had long been proven by science when 
large building material producers still insisted that 
slates and asbestos-cement pipes were harmless. It 
also took a long time to convince economic actors 
that halogenated hydrocarbons damage the ozone 
layer and to achieve limitation or prohibition of their 
production and use. 
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 The front page of the world-renowned 
economics periodical The Economist has hardly 
featured anything but climate-change-related news 
for the last couple of years. Still, I am rather certain 
that it is not these articles but rather extreme weather 
events (like the 2005 Hurricane Katrina that killed 
more than 1800 people and flooded the city of New 
Orleans) that will call the attention of the public to 
the potentially disastrous impacts of climate change. 
The tsunami following the Great Sumatra-Andaman 
earthquake which killed 225,000 people has had a 
more significant effect on humanity than all the UN 
development summits that have been held for years. 
These phenomena made the public realize that, in 
spite of all our ingenuity, humanity does not “rule 
over” nature. It took more than 225,000 lives to make 
us consider that all we have “achieved” so far is to 
create a weapons stockpile which, even in case of 
an accidental misunderstanding, is powerful enough 
to destroy the entire Earth. We do not, however, 
have anything to protect us from drought-triggered 
famines, or AIDS, and even less from earthquakes, 
the latter of which we cannot even forecast. Even 
the most sophisticated models fail at coping with 
nature’s “inventiveness.” 
 We are surrounded by natural and industrial 
disasters. The threat is growing continuously despite 
humanity’s enormous efforts to avoid risks. The 
figure below makes it obvious that even though 
international efforts have increased in number, 
industrial disasters have not become any less 
frequent. The waves stirred by Hungary’s 2010 red 
mud catastrophe have not even settled yet, and still 
we are already in the middle of a nuclear crisis at 
Japan’s tsunami-stricken power plant.
 Risk, by definition, is the product of two factors, 
the amount of damage expected to be done by an event that 
threatens people’s lives and valuables and the probability 
of that event occurring. Given the continuous growth in 
the population of the Earth (and in the wealth it possesses), 
environmental risks are obviously increasing as well, no 
matter whether disasters are becoming more frequent or not.
Figure 1: Historical overview of accidents
Image 1: Aznalcollar (Spain). Failure of tailings 
dam retaining wall, 25 April, 1998.
Image 2:Kolontar (Hungary). Failure of the ‘red 
mud’ dam retaining wall, 12 October, 2010. .
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Still, the answer to the popular question whether 
today’s world is more dangerous or not is rather 
unclear. Have natural disasters really become more 
common, or is it just the damage done that has 
grown? There is no definite answer. As a result of 
a globalizing world and advanced communication 
infrastructure, the number of known / reported 
catastrophes is relatively high but that does not 
necessarily mean there has been an actual increase 
in their frequency. The total number of victims also 
is not above the average of many years. 
 Considering per capita damage, the picture 
is even more confusing. The population of the 
Earth continues to grow exponentially, thus the 
denominator also grows rapidly. Yet while the 
number and severity of disasters is fluctuating, 
there is no clearly visible upward trend. This would 
suggest a drop in relative risk. The increase in risk, 
consequently, is instead caused by rapid growth in 
accumulated wealth, which also is responsible for the 
increasing value of insured damage (see figure 3).
 Even conservative professionals have no doubt 
that the risks related to climate change have actually 
increased. Among other phenomena, floods are often 
associated with climate change and are apparently 
becoming more and more common in Europe as well. 
As evidenced by the two tables below, European 
statistics about the frequency of and the damage caused 
by floods do not fully support the former assumption 
though floods have indeed become more frequent, 
both the numbers of people affected and the amount of 
damage caused has fallen during the last ten years. The 
improvement indicated by these figures is, of course, 
a consequence of efficient flood control measures. As 
we can see, appropriate protection might offset or even 
reduce the growth in risk induced by accumulation of 
Figure 2. Columns show the numbers of victims in millions, while the dashed line represents the number of 
reported events.  (“Guha-Sapir D, Vos F, Below R, with Ponserre S. Annual Disaster Statistical Review 2010: 
The Numbers and Trends. Brussels: CRED; 2011. p.3. http://www.cred.be/sites/default/files/ADSR_2010.pdf.)
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wealth.
 Nevertheless, the costs of protective 
measures are very high. Rich European countries 
already have appropriate flood protection systems 
in place, yet efforts still continue. In economically 
underdeveloped regions like Bangladesh, floods still 
cause incredible devastation. The 1970 storm took 
more than half a million lives; the storm in 1991 
killed “only” 138,000, while the 2007 flood caused 
1,042 deaths. Although flood control protection 
systems are being built in these regions, too, the 
poor are more severely hit by natural disasters. 
Some storms and floods can at least be forecast in 
advance. There are, however, natural disasters that 
cannot be predicted, and there is no suitable way of 
ensuring protection against them. Earthquakes or 
tsunamis will follow some of them.
II. COMBINATIONS OF NATURAL 
AND INDUSTRIAL DISASTERS
The red mud spill in Hungary was a special 
combination of an industrial and a natural disaster. 
This is one of the reasons it is difficult to pinpoint 
who is responsible for the event. Natural disasters 
1980-2009 2000-2009
Number of 
floods
239 147
Number of 
countries 
affected
22 19
Number of 
people killed
1309 511
Number of 
people affected 
(millions)
3.0 1.3
Economic losses  
(billion USD)
92.3 45.0
Table 1: Floods and their Impacts (total) in 
European Countries. Source: EM-DAT The OFDA/
CRED International Disaster Database
Figure 3: Changes in Economic Losses (green columns) and Insured Damage (blue columns), 1950 to 
2000. (Source: Munich Re: 2000 http://www.munichre-foundation.org/NR/rdonlyres/E7ED6B1D-
2D9F-4E64-9FB3-5C8A4539AD9B/0/20051116_Hoeppe_Hohenkammer_short_WEB.pdf)
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tend to raise questions about responsibility that are 
different from those of an industrial catastrophe. 
Interestingly, however, nature often plays an 
important role in industrial disasters. Extreme 
weather played a role in both the Exxon Valdez 
incident and the accident in the Gulf of Mexico. The 
role of exceptional weather conditions—rainfall 
amounting to ten times the average and a severe 
windstorm—was also mentioned in connection with 
the accident in Hungary. Yet do extreme rains and 
winds, as extraordinary natural phenomena, relieve 
corporate managers from their responsibilities or 
limit their extent thereof? How should the important 
principles of environmental protection, such as the 
“principle of due diligence” or the “precautionary 
principle,” be interpreted in the context of industrial 
disasters or activities associated with high ecological risks? 
 The Harvard case study treated the Exxon 
Valdez incident as a human resource issue. According 
to the study written by the world’s leading business 
school, the problem was that the tanker’s captain 
was an alcoholic. Leaving the crew and the cargo to 
be transported by an alcoholic was no doubt an HR 
mistake as well. 
 It is surprising, however, that the case study 
did not mention the continuous environmental 
catastrophe many huge oil tankers had been causing. 
They regularly pumped sea water into their tanks 
on the way back from port and then pumped the 
oil-contaminated water back into the sea near the 
oil port. No one intended to call to account the 
owners for this “slow catastrophe.” Also, the case 
study never mentioned that the size of the tankers 
represented an unjustifiable magnitude of risk. Those 
enormous tankers were only built to economize on 
oil transportation costs. Accordingly, fuel became 
a bit cheaper in the US, while corporations’ profits 
grew still larger. Whether the saving of a few cents 
per liter is worth the increased risk of a potential 
environmental disaster has, “naturally enough,” 
never been investigated.
 Morelli (1999) argue that business 
and industry are preparing for dramatic shift in 
responsibility. Recent decades have showed that trust 
has become a fundamental issue for both governments 
and economic actors. According to Eurobarometer 
surveys, politicians and corporate managers are 
no longer trusted by European citizens and neither 
are scientists. One could make the rather cynical 
argument that the public does not greatly trust NGOs 
Countries Number of floods Number of people 
killed
Number of people 
affected
Economic losses 
(billion USD)
Romania 25 169 1187,400 1.7
France 14 34 22,500 1.6
Greece 14 15 12,200 0.7
Italy 13 72 20,000 2.1
UK 12 26 379,500 16.6
Bulgaria 11 52 13,300 0.5
Austria 8 1 45,800 0.2
Hungary 6 14 61,400 3.8
Czech Republic 6 38 218,800 3.1
Germany 6 29 331,600 14.1
Table 2: European Countries most Severely Hit by Floods (2000-2009)  Source: EM-DAT The OFDA/
CRED International Disaster Database
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either, even though the public establishes them. 
 It was an apparent sign of mistrust that, 
besides Hungarian green organizations, two 
international NGOs – Greenpeace and Robin des Bois 
from France – also decided to have an on-the-ground 
presence at the site of the red mud catastrophe. 
 Based on the work of respectable scientists 
and a number of studies, a significant number 
of Hungarian institutions concluded that neither 
drinking water sources nor the soil were endangered 
by the spilt material; nevertheless the two NGOs 
flooded the media with statements claiming quite 
the opposite.
 “Robin des Bois can not really give credence 
to the statements of those Hungarian professors 
and scientists who claim that there is no risk of 
radioactivity, nor of heavy metal migration into the 
deep soil layers” (36). This is despite the fact that 
they only sent two experts to the affected area who 
reported that “The area flooded by the red mud spill 
in Hungary directly affects the lives of some 8,500 
inhabitants. Only to mention a couple of examples: 
approximately 70 tons of arsenic, 70 t lead, 130 t 
nickel, 650 t chromium, 700 t vanadium, 1 600 t 
sulfur and 114 000 tons of aluminum were released 
into nature. Arsenic, nickel and chromium 6 have 
carcinogenic effects” (3).
 And: “On 4 October 2010, at 1:30pm, the 
western wall of one of a chain of red mud reservoirs 
operated by Magyar Alumínium ZRt—MAL 
collapsed, freeing about 600 to 1,000 thousand 
cubic meters of red mud, a waste product of the 
bauxite refining process” (4).
 I did not actually check whether these 
numbers are correct, but they do sound rather 
frightening. What I do know, however, is that 
those elements were not added to the mud during 
the process, but they were there originally, and 
their concentration could have doubled at most, 
and even then only if the bauxite had been of very 
good quality. (In this case sodium hydroxide would 
have dissolved at almost half of the bauxite ore—
only the aluminum oxide part—thereby increasing 
the concentration of various other elements in the 
remaining mud.). Of course, that does not make 
those elements “free” either, as they are present in 
the mud in the form of insoluble compounds. 
 A long citation such as the following may not 
be exactly appropriate, yet in this very case, it might 
be worth knowing what the “official” statement (not 
really read by anyone outside Hungary) reports:
 “Based on the independent examinations of 
the National Institute of Environmental Health and the 
experts of HAS, there are no significant amounts of metal 
contaminants in the red sludge and the concentrations 
of toxic metals do not exceed the standard limits in the 
soil, but the pH measured from an aqueous extract of the 
industrial waste is 11.8, which indicates a strong base. 
According to the analysis of the samples taken by the 
Institute of Materials and Environmental Chemistry of 
the Hungarian Academy of Sciences on October 5th, 
the red sludge contained cadmium, chrome, mercury, 
nickel, lead and zinc in concentrations smaller (in some 
cases considerably smaller) than the values allowed for 
waste mud. The arsenic content of the samples taken 
from the area of Kolontár and analyzed by the Institute 
of Materials and Environmental Chemistry was also 
less than the values allowed. The laboratory analysis of 
the soil samples taken on October 8, 2010 conducted by 
HAS’ Research Institute for Soil Science and Agricultural 
Chemistry has shown that heavy metals from the red 
sludge did not reach deeper than 10 centimeters into the 
soil, and even there their level did not exceed the values 
permitted for contaminants. Based on these results, it is 
safe to conclude that the deeper layers of the soil and the 
first water-table are not in immediate danger. 
 Based on laboratory analyses, the Office 
of the Chief Medical Officer has issued a statement 
to the effect that the red sludge waste matter is 
dangerous to human health, living organisms, and 
the environment because of its highly basic effect.
Experts of the National Service for Radiation Health 
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Emergency Preparedness examined the radiation 
levels of the affected area, mainly in Kolontár and 
Devecser. The spilled red sludge is not radioactive. 
The so-called activity-concentration of the samples 
gathered is close to natural values of soil, so it is safe 
to say that they do not pose health risks. According 
to the official statement of the National Service for 
Radiation Health Emergency Preparedness, the red 
sludge does not pose any health risk for those living 
in the area as far as radioactivity is concerned.
 After the analysis of the samples taken 
according to strict regulations, The University 
of Pannonia and the National Public Health and 
Medical Officer Service announced that the amount 
of airborne dust in the affected areas has not exceeded 
the levels allowed since October 17, and the level 
of air pollution has decreased in every settlement 
examined. In order to continuously monitor the level 
of airborne dust in the affected areas, the National 
Service for Public Health and the Middle-Danube-
Valley Inspectorate for Environmental Protection, 
Nature Conservation and Water Management have 
been operating an integrated monitoring system 
since October 11.
 There is on-going quality control of 
drinking water in the area stricken by the disaster. 
Water can be safely consumed over the whole area. 
The Middle Transdanubian Regional Institute 
of the National Public Health and Medical 
Officer Service has conducted more than 120 
examinations so far to monitor the quality of water, 
and all results are negative.” (http://mta.hu/
mta_hirei/osszefoglalo-a-vorosiszap-katasztrofa-
elharitasarol-a-karmentesitesrol-es-a-hosszu-tavu-
teendokrol-125859/)
 An international NGO, some easy-
to-deceive Hungarians might think surely the 
government wants to do us some good. It is no 
wonder that society’s trust has faded, a finding which 
is worsened by news broadcasts that reveal serious 
defects in our institutions, indicating, for example, 
that we could not even pinpoint the authorities 
responsible for licensing or operational supervision.
 “In its ruling, the Budapest Court of Appeal 
named the Middle-Danube-Valley Inspectorate for 
Environmental Protection, Nature Conservation 
and Water Management as the building control and 
construction supervisory authority responsible for 
the Ajka mud reservoirs,” reported daily newspaper 
Népszabadság. This recent final ruling put an end 
to the legal debate whether it was the local notary 
or the environmental authority that should have 
inspected the condition of the walls of the ruptured 
reservoir. In its decision, the court concluded that 
the red mud reservoir and similar facilities “had 
required and still require special licensing and 
operational regulations which can not be handled 
in standard building control proceedings.” Thus the 
Ajka alumina plant falls under the scope of authority 
of the environmental inspectorate. Following the 
red mud catastrophe, Secretary for Environmental 
Affairs, Zoltán Illés, declared that it was not the 
authority under the supervision of his own office 
but rather the local notary who acted as a building 
control authority in the case of the reservoirs. After 
the accident, the regional environmental inspectorate 
and the Public Administration Office of Veszprém 
County ordered several building control proceedings 
to be conducted by the notary of Devecser, who, 
however, declined to do so “for lack of authority.”
( h t t p : / / g r e e n p r o f i t . h u / f o r u m / v i e w t o p i c .
php?f=34&p=28048)
 The debate, of course, is still ongoing. 
Interestingly, society has begun to pay more 
attention to the role of authorities and other 
political aspects, while limiting the responsibility 
of the company operating the reservoirs to the 
question of material compensation, just as good 
taxpayers do. The “big” questions turn out to 
be,Who issued the permits and who supervised 
the operation of the reservoirs? In this case, the 
question of responsibility is a multi-faceted one. 
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Concerning the responsibility of the local notary 
or the mayor, one might ask why there were 
people living near the dam and how and why their 
permits had been issued, or, if they did not have 
the necessary permits, why was it not ensured that 
they were prohibited from actually living there? 
It is hard to imagine, however, how a local notary 
could be responsible for the building permits for 
the reservoir itself. Having some knowledge about 
how environmental authorities operate, we know 
that they also do not have the necessary expertise. 
The Office of the Parliamentary Commissioner for 
Future Generations suggested that the Hungarian 
Office for Mining and Geology might be the 
competent authority. Although we know this now, 
it was not all that clear up until now. Had we known 
the competent authority, could we have avoided 
the disaster? Probably not. Supposedly, satellite 
measurements might be able to detect whether the 
soil is moving and how fast. If it is actually moving, 
this could lead to the failure of the dam. Who should 
conduct such examinations, the authorities or the 
company operating the reservoir? Both of them, I 
guess, but the “principle of due diligence” would 
rather assign that responsibility to the operating 
party, especially as the authorities, under the 
“precautionary principle,” hardly have a chance 
to know all the potential risks, technologies, and 
sources of human error. The operating company 
has the necessary means for that, and they, too, 
earn the profit and not (or just very indirectly) 
authority employees. 
 Risk theory distinguishes between fair 
and unfair risks. A risk is considered fair if the 
accidental and material damage of the hazardous 
activity is borne by the same “person” who enjoys 
its benefits. This is, of course, merely rational (or 
maybe even emotional) reasoning. Most likely, 
legislation could never deal in practice with such 
concepts. International experience and practice, 
which may serve as a starting point in finding a 
solution, do, nevertheless, exist in this field.
III. INDUSTRIAL DISASTERS AND 
HOW THEY ARE TREATED
Recently, the number of cases where managers have been 
subjected to criminal trial because of their companies’ 
environmentally harmful activities has been growing, 
primarily in Canada and the US. This is theoretically 
possible under Hungarian legislation as well. Managers 
usually react defensively to actual legal practice. First, 
professional reactions tend to emphasize the need for 
adjustments in legal practice and for providing improved 
personal protection to managers.
 Corporate managers, apparently, consider 
complex, bureaucratic, and overdocumented 
environmental management systems (typically 
developed by external consultants) to be the best 
method of defense in civil law proceedings, though 
it is quite obvious from American examples that this 
is not a sure-fire method of defense. 
 The environmental risk of any activity is 
inherently uncertain, even theoretically. Wynne 
makes a convincing point about this with respect to 
hazardous waste materials, “Scientific uncertainty is 
rather high about what is going on inside a waste 
dump site in chemical, physical and biological terms, 
while opportunities for examining and reducing this 
uncertainty are very limited. Therefore we can only 
make approximations about the impact a dumpsite 
has on the surrounding area, as the effects are 
always dependent on how the dumpsite is operated. 
The conditions under which waste is transferred to 
a dumpsite and which site it is transferred to is also 
a function of a number of unknown social factors” 
(Wynne).
 Considering Wynne’s thoughts, one might 
conclude that corporate managers practice the 
“art of the impossible” concerning environmental 
management. Yet we should not forget that the lack 
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of a theoretical solution does not necessarily imply 
that there is no practical solution. Concerning the 
avoidance of environmental risks, scientific accuracy 
is not a requirement but on the contrary responsible 
conduct is (usually defined as due diligence in legal 
terms) (Bartman). 
 For practical purposes, the environmental 
risks of any business activity can be analyzed 
along two dimensions. One of them, in our opinion, 
is a function of the materials, technologies, and 
human resources used, since these are the factors 
determining the company’s inputs and outputs and 
also the frequency and the course of breakdowns. 
This dimension contains everything that depends on 
the internal systems of the company.
 The other dimension is the company’s 
perception of the ever-changing outside world. We 
consider this dimension as including the company’s 
geographical location, the ecological characteristics 
of the surroundings, biodiversity, prevailing winds in 
addition to demographics (population density, age, 
and income distribution), and other characteristics 
such as the existing infrastructure (roads, 
telecommunication networks, and the presence 
of hazard intervention systems), the population’s 
educational level, environmental attitudes, 
employment levels, and political institutions. 
 Obviously, both dimensions are rather 
complex, but making a distinction is important 
as both corporate managers and regulators tend 
to devote serious attention to the first dimension 
(environmental risks pertaining to the company’s 
internal matters), while the effects on risk of all the 
external factors have an inclination to be forgotten 
by both directors and the authorities. Typically, it is 
only after a major catastrophe that they realize the 
existence of these phenomena.
 There are many examples that demonstrate 
the significance of these two dimensions. In Hungary, 
for instance, a number of chemical factories have 
found themselves enclosed by ever-expanding 
cities. Previously, while still located in the outskirts, 
not even a factory with serious pollution potential 
had caused a problem, as any pollution releases 
were diluted before reaching the more densely 
populated city areas. Later, however, the situation 
changed. Today, even a company strictly adhering 
to all pro-environmental requirements might have 
environment-related conflicts and issues.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
 
Informing local citizens and preparing them for 
damage containment is at least as important to the 
future of the company as reducing the probability 
of occurrence. In the case of a potential accident, 
it is critical whether or not local inhabitants and 
disaster response organizations are prepared to 
reduce the adverse consequences of any accidents. 
Both the Bhopal and the Chernobyl disasters, and 
even this recent red mud catastrophe in Hungary, 
would have claimed far fewer lives if the authorities 
and inhabitants had been prepared for the possible 
occurrence of such an emergency. 
 We believe that companies should not limit 
their theoretical and practical environmental risk 
prevention efforts to their own premises but also 
should have to take into account the constantly 
changing natural and social environment. Corporate 
environmental management, thus, must not be 
limited to within the company’s own four walls. 
 What we can learn from the red-mud 
accident in Hungary and from Bhopal and other 
above mentioned cases, that corporations very 
often prepared for accidents but even more often 
they are insured against them. Managers are ready 
to make any efforts which reduces  their personal 
responsibility. They are often employing external 
experts preferable very highly respected ones, they 
are ready to pay for an expensive insurance and they 
are ready to cooperate with different authorities. All 
this will not protect them fully against the accidents.
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Any company  has to meet with the strickest 
environmental and risk regulation and should have 
a good environmental performance record, and 
keep good communications with people living in 
the surrounding. But they have to understand, that 
the good communication and the implemented 
environmental management system, the experts and 
the advisers even the „working permission” issued 
by different legal authorities, can not protect them 
against their moral responsibility for the society and 
for the local community. Those who are directly 
gaining the benefit (profit) from an operation, they 
are and they should be the real experts, so they 
should take the full responsibility for it, even in a 
case of natural disaster or terrorist action against 
them. The moral responsibility of corporate leaders 
can not be shared with external actors.
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